This paper argues for a comprehensive conception of empathy as comprising epistemic, affective, and motivational elements and introduces the ancient Stoic theory of attachment (Greek,oikeiōsis) as a model for describing the embodied, emotional response to others that we take to be distinctive of empathy. Our argument entails that in order to provide a suitable conceptual framework for the interdisciplinary study of empathy one must extend the scope of recent “simulationalist” and “enactivist” accounts of empathy in two important respects. First, against (...) the enactivist assumption that human mindreading capacities primarily rely on an immediate, quasi-perceptual understanding of other’s intentional states, we draw on Alfred Schutz’ analysis of social understanding to argue that reflective types of understanding play a distinct, but equally fundamental role in empathic engagements. Second, we insist that empathy also involves an affective response toward the other and their situation (as the empathizer perceives this). We suggest analyzing this response in terms of the Stoic concepts of attachment, concern, and a fundamental type of prosocial motivation, that can best be described as an “extended partiality.” By way of conclusion, we integrate the above concepts into a comprehensive conceptual framework for the study of empathy and briefly relate them to current debates about empathic perception and prosocial motivation. The result, we argue, is an account that stays neutral with regard to the exact nature of the processes involved in producing empathy and can therefore accommodate discussion across theoretical divides—e.g., those between enactivist, simulationalist, and so-called theory-theorist approaches. (shrink)

We develop canonical rules capable of axiomatizing all systems of multiple-conclusion rules over K4 or IPC, by extension of the method of canonical formulas by Zakharyaschev [37]. We use the framework to give an alternative proof of the known analysis of admissible rules in basic transitive logics, which additionally yields the following dichotomy: any canonical rule is either admissible in the logic, or it is equivalent to an assumption-free rule. Other applications of canonical rules include a generalization of the Blok–Esakia (...) theorem and the theory of modal companions to systems of multiple-conclusion rules or (finitary structural global) consequence relations, and a characterization of splittings in the lattices of consequence relations over monomodal or superintuitionistic logics with the finite model property. (shrink)

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

In his book The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan Kvanvig argues that there is an interchangeability of personal and doxastic justification, which ‘blocks the quick route to virtue epistemology’. To prove that personal justification is reducible to doxastic justification, he utilizes λ-calculus expressions that aim to show the logical equivalence of the two notions of justification. In this paper, I argue that he has made an illegitimate move (...) in his translation of the ordinary talk of personal justification into λ-expressions because his translation involves both an elimination from and an addition to the ordinary language. Pace Kvanvig, there is no logical equivalence of personal to doxastic justification. So, his argument for the reducibility of personal to doxastic justification founders. More importantly, since he has failed to disprove that personal justification is irreducibly primitive, he hasn’t shown that the prospects for virtue epistemology are ‘hopeless’. (shrink)

We study the extension 123) of the theory S21 by instances of the dual weak pigeonhole principle for p-time functions, dWPHPx2x. We propose a natural framework for formalization of randomized algorithms in bounded arithmetic, and use it to provide a strengthening of Wilkie's witnessing theorem for S21+dWPHP. We construct a propositional proof system WF , which captures the Π1b-consequences of S21+dWPHP. We also show that WF p-simulates the Unstructured Extended Nullstellensatz proof system of Buss et al. 256). We prove that (...) dWPHP is equivalent to a statement asserting the existence of a family of Boolean functions with exponential circuit complexity. Building on this result, we formalize the Nisan–Wigderson construction in a conservative extension of S21+dWPHP. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Continuum Companion to PragmatismEmil VišvovskýSami Pihlström, ed. The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism London and New York: Continuum, 2011, xv + 307 pp., includes index.The scholarship on pragmatism has been burgeoning over the past few decades, and a host of books and papers is being published all over the globe, not only within the US, the country of its origin. One of the results (and motivations) has been (...) that pragmatists themselves have started to understand their own philosophy better, which is not to be wondered since pragmatism over the course of its more than a century-long history has been causing confusion even among its own proponents, let alone outsiders. What still is required are new readings of pragmatism, both historical and systematic.Within the context of several recently published volumes that can serve as companions to pragmatism (or American philosophy) of various kinds,1 the present book is special in a number of ways. First of all, [End Page 234] the fact that this companion has been edited by a non-American pragmatist (when there certainly must have been many American candidates for the editorship) is unusual and may serve as a timely "Europeanization" of pragmatism, not only because of its strong emphasis on the Kantian link but also as a companion that finally depicts pragmatism as a school of Western philosophy not so far removed from the interests and intentions of the traditional Continental as well as the British analytic school. This timely volume definitely shows it is high time to close the gap dividing the most relevant Western philosophies. The old story of pragmatism as an exclusively American philosophy should be overturned as should the story of pragmatism as rival to those other philosophical "adversaries," mostly Continental metaphysics and Analytic epistemology. Pragmatism is not an anti-philosophy that aims to do away with all the others, as well as itself, in the final battle at the end of philosophy. Pragmatism is neither menace nor jeopardy for the rest of philosophy (despite the fact that such sentiments toward it might still be felt elsewhere). Rather, pragmatism is the continuation of philosophy via its transformation, more or less radical. And, as must be stressed at this point, the philosophical spirit of pragmatism is cooperative while its philosophical style is via media.Further, it is important to develop pragmatist scholarship outside the US, especially in Europe, where resistance toward pragmatism (no matter whether for good or bad reasons) is considerable even today. Thus pragmatism will have no chance unless it shows its ability and competence to provide its own philosophical outlook on all traditional philosophical issues. And this, again, is perhaps more important especially without the US, because the question "how to be a pragmatist in a non-pragmatist milieu?" is very pertinent there. Europeans are still philosophically Eurocentric and unfavorably inclined toward other schools and styles of thought, let alone "American pragmatism", which is tinged with the hint of a bad name, American cultural and political imperialism, etc. If you want to work on pragmatism in Europe, you will have to demonstrate (if possible) that you are not an American agent (or worse, a spy) and that via pragmatism you do not propagate anything of "Americanism" through which you intend to colonize and conquer all those Europeans. Since philosophy is a cultural phenomenon, it is always difficult to delineate the two, but it must be done because philosophy is not identical with any culture and can stand in critical opposition to it. The latter is certainly the case with pragmatism and its relationship to its domestic culture. In this context, the distinction that James Campbell (p. 69) makes at the beginning of his short chapter on the history of pragmatism, peppered with interesting and fresh insights, is crucial. The following caveat should be borne in mind every time the term "pragmatism" is used: pragmatism outside philosophy means two things: 1. "the simple practicalism of the traditional [End Page 235] American lifestyle" involving "popular anti-intellectualism that sees action as more important than thinking," or simply activism in opposition to idleness; and 2. "shallow opportunism," whose only goal is personal success, which is present... (shrink)

There have been few attempts thus far to read Rorty through a humanistic lens. This paper is an attempt at making explicit some of the key features of his conception. My main objective is to show that humanism is integral to his philosophy and to explain what it consists in. I focus on Rorty’s secular humanism, which I believe lies at the center of his thought. In sections 2 and 3, I provide an account of key humanist sources, both pragmatist (...) and non-pragmatist. Section 4 examines recent interpretations of Rorty as a humanist. In section 5, I focus on the distinction between the human and nonhuman as the central feature of his humanism. Section 6 outlines Rorty’s project to humanize humanity. In the concluding section, I summarize the key features of his humanism. (shrink)

Alienation is among the most influential terms in Marxist theory, but also one of the most ambiguous and controversial. Unlike previous literature, which has tended to focus on Marx’ early philosophical writings, this offers a novel reinterpretation of the theory of alienation found in Marx’s later works. Rather than conceiving alienation as a subjective experience or an inherent feature of social organization, I contend that alienation in the Marxist sense can be understood as an objective process arising from the appropriation (...) of the results of production and their transformation into capital. This interpretation resolves the main theoretical problems conventionally associated with alienation theory, for example the tendency towards essentialism and moral paternalism. In particular, a Marxist theory of alienation explains the paradox of social power and isolation that characterizes contemporary capitalist societies, in which feelings of powerlessness and loneliness are intensified despite objective increases in humanity’s social power and interdependence. (shrink)

We show how to formalize approximate counting via hash functions in subsystems of bounded arithmetic, using variants of the weak pigeonhole principle. We discuss several applications, including a proof of the tournament principle, and an improvement on the known relationship of the collapse of the bounded arithmetic hierarchy to the collapse of the polynomial-time hierarchy.

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler’s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in (...) deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent’s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler. (shrink)

Comprises the Charles F. Deems Lectures delivered at New York University in 1968. Discusses the significance of the Holocaust, emphasizing theological issues, and its uniqueness in history. An authentic response to it - religious or secular - is a commitment to the autonomy and security of the State of Israel. Refers to Jewish midrash to explore the meaning and significance of the Holocaust and relates Jewish thinking about the Holocaust to Jewish thinking about earlier catastrophes. Jewish particularism remains a scandal (...) to modern secularism. Pt. 3 (p. 67-104), "The Commanding Voice of Auschwitz", states that the death of God occurs in the inward realm of the spirit alone and nowhere else. The imperative for Jews is not to flee being Jewish: "Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded to survive as Jews". (shrink)

The first attempt at a systematic approach to axiomatic theories of truth was undertaken by Friedman and Sheard (Ann Pure Appl Log 33:1–21, 1987). There twelve principles consisting of axioms, axiom schemata and rules of inference, each embodying a reasonable property of truth were isolated for study. Working with a base theory of truth conservative over PA, Friedman and Sheard raised the following questions. Which subsets of the Optional Axioms are consistent over the base theory? What are the proof-theoretic strengths (...) of the consistent theories? The first question was answered completely by Friedman and Sheard; all subsets of the Optional Axioms were classified as either consistent or inconsistent giving rise to nine maximal consistent theories of truth.They also determined the proof-theoretic strength of two subsets of the Optional Axioms. The aim of this paper is to continue the work begun by Friedman and Sheard. We will establish the proof-theoretic strength of all the remaining seven theories and relate their arithmetic part to well-known theories ranging from PA to the theory of ${\Sigma^1_1}$ dependent choice. (shrink)

It has been argued that Hume's denial of infinite divisibility entails the falsity of most of the familiar theorems of Euclidean geometry, including the Pythagorean theorem and the bisection theorem. I argue that Hume's thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of Euclidean geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and (...) an imprecise standard of equality in extension. Hume's project is different from the attempt made by Berkeley in some of his later writings to save Euclidean geometry. Unlike Berkeley, who interprets the theorems of Euclidean geometry as false albeit useful approximations of geometrical facts, Hume is able to save most of the central theorems as true. (shrink)

U radu se kritički osvjetljava pojam slobode u okviru filozofske misli Immanuela Kanta. Ovime se prvenstveno misli na njegov etički nauk, pa posredno i na epistemološki i estetički, koji na njega upućuju i kroz njega se utemeljuju. Cilj rada je pokazati da se sloboda, tumačena u oba svoja aspekta , dade izjednačiti s konceptima autonomije i spontaniteta. Ovim se pak putem, obzirom da je sloboda ratio essendi moralnoga zakona, može argumentirati i u korist teze o praktičkom jedinstvu slobode i moralnog (...) zakona. Dodatno, u radu se analiziraju interpretativne implikacije kao i teškoće koje se javljaju čak i u tumačenjima eminentnih poznavatelja Kantove misli, poput L. W. Becka i N. Hartmanna.This paper aims to critically examine and evaluate the whole of Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of the notion of freedom. Freedom, both in its negative and positive capacity, as well as in it’s purely practical sense, serves as a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophical enquiry and the one true medium of the mind both in the practical and theoretical sense. Along with the aforementioned negative-positive dichotomy, freedom can further be distinguished as being one with the concept of the autonomy of the mind. Through this connection, freedom becomes, as its ratio essendi, practically one with the moral law itself, the latter being a form of the former. From the idea of freedom, various implications emerge, which have been dealt with through the course of the essay. In this respect, particular attention is paid to Kant’s notion of will and some of the misunderstandings it managed to create among notable Kant scholars like L. W. Beck and N. Hartmann. (shrink)

The author attempts to emphasize several aspects of religious types of discrimination that apply to women in different practices of Christian Orthodoxy. The basis of these interpretations is found both in the Bible and in the traditional writings of the church. This text suggests several solutions for locating the fundamentals that would allow for a renewal of the ecclesiastical practices in such a manner as to eliminate all possible discrimination that women are subjected to in the church.

IN THE PREFACE to his Philosophy of Right Hegel writes: "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig"--"What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational." In paragraph 6 of the third edition of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences he repeats this statement verbatim, calling it "simple." Few interpreters, however, have ever found it so. Even friendly critics are baffled; hostile ones dismiss it as either scandalous or senseless. Two centuries after Hegel's birth (...) there is thus still room for a modest exposition of the meaning of this famous Hegelian statement, much more so for one of its "simplicity." Both tasks, however--and in particular the second, seemingly hopeless one--should be undertaken in full awareness of two conditions which the Encyclopedia passage considers evident but which can be taken as such no longer. One is possession of "religion." The other is the kind of philosophical "culture" which includes "knowledge" of "God.". (shrink)

David Lewis argued that Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are “one and the same problem” or, to be more precise, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is nothing else than “two Newcomb problems side by side” (Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:235–240, 1979 : 235). It has been objected that his argument fails to take into account certain epistemic asymmetries which undermine the one-problem thesis. Sobel ( 1985 ) acknowledges that many tokens satisfy the structural requirements of both problems, while questioning (...) the generality of the thesis. Bermúdez (Analysis 73:423–429, 2013 ), on the other hand, argues that there is a deeper structural conflict between the two problems in the sense that the epistemic requirements that give Newcomb’s Problem its force are precisely those that prevent it from being a Prisoner’s Dilemma. I argue that the epistemic asymmetry objections raised by Sobel and Bermúdez fail to undermine the one-problem thesis. A different type of objection raised by Bermúdez, one which relies on the contrast between parametric and strategic choices, fares no better. Although NP is a problem that has been primarily studied for its implications to decision theory, it contains enough game theoretic elements to justify the claim that a juxtaposition of two such problems can be thought of as a strategic game. (shrink)

This appraisal became conventional opinion, and has remained conventional opinion until this day. In practically any history of philosophy which bothers with Schelling at all one can find this threefold condemnation of his work: that it consists of a number of more or less disconnected systems; that none of these is properly worked out; and that from 1804 on, they get worse and worse. As a result of this opinion, few historians have been interested in Schelling. When in 1944 air (...) raids destroyed the Munich University Library, among the treasures destroyed were thousands of Schelling manuscript pages, mostly written in his later years. It seems that in nearly one hundred years nobody was sufficiently interested in these manuscripts to do anything with them. (shrink)

The paper aims to complete the epistemological opposition of genesis and validity by discussing two types of their interconnection. On the one hand, it deals with genealogical arguments in the context of practical reasoning. This applies for positive justification (e.g. by tradition) as well as for negative delegitimisation (for instance Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality). On the other hand, it is about the hermeneutic explication of signification. Historical reflection offers ways to understand the meaning of an institution, the (perhaps hidden) (...) signification of a thesis or a tradition. An informative paradigm thereof is the self-understanding of philosophy concerning its own issues and definition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Benedict XVI, A Life: Volume 1, Youth in Nazi Germany to the Second Vatican Council 1927–1965 by Peter SeewaldEmil AntonBenedict XVI, A Life: Volume 1, Youth in Nazi Germany to the Second Vatican Council 1927–1965 by Peter Seewald, translated by Dinah Livingstone (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2020), xi + 500 pp.What better way to spend Pope Benedict XVI's ninety-fourth birthday than by reviewing a Ratzinger biography while having Apfelstrudel (...) and some traditional Bavarian beer?German journalist and author Peter Seewald, who in his many interviews has asked Joseph Ratzinger / Pope Benedict XVI a total of two thousand or more questions (ix), has written a splendid biography that surprises even someone who has already read dozens of books by and about Benedict XVI. Written in an extremely enjoyable style and divided into chapters of just the perfect length, this page-turner deserves the highest praise. It will likely take its place alongside George Weigel's famous (and equally massive) biography of Pope John Paul II, Witness to Hope.The German biography has been divided into two volumes in English (vol. 2 was just published in November of 2021). Volume 1 deals with the years 1927–1965, dominated by two historic "Twos": World War II and Vatican II. Theologically, this is the period of the progressive Ratzinger (regardless of whether he "converted" to a more conservative stance later on), or as Seewald puts it, a man formed by "liberal Bavarian Catholicism" (124).Seewald provides lots of new and interesting information about Joseph Ratzinger, both bitter and sweet. One example from the early chapters concerns the origins of Ratzinger's mother. It turns out that she was an illegitimate child and not actually from South Tyrol, contrary to what her children had thought. A local historian has discovered that Ratzinger's mother Maria was actually born in Mühlbach "in the district of Rosenheim,... in a house that specialized in helping unmarried pregnant women to give birth" (15).For the romantic, the sweetest story of the book comes when Seewald [End Page 963] pushes the reserved Pope Emeritus to reveal more about the "painful decisions" that the young Munich seminarian had to make in relation to his vocation as a celibate priest. "'Were you in love with a girl?' 'Perhaps.' 'So, yes?' 'It could be interpreted like that.' 'How long did this passionate time last? A few weeks? A few months?' 'Longer'" (219). Ratzinger was in love! Or at least it could be interpreted like that! Other heart-warming details include the revelation that Ratzinger's childhood teddy from Marktl followed him all the way to the Apostolic Palace, as well as the fact that, when his blind brother Georg (now deceased) needed a housekeeper, Benedict XVI personally organized the job interview in the Vatican gardens.A darker episode, minimized in Ratzinger's autobiographical memoirs, concerns his role in the radar crew of the German anti-aircraft forces in World War II. The future Pope was entrusted with the task of targeting British bombers. Seewald fills in the narrative: "Ratzinger delivered readings for three guns,.... The more precisely Joseph measured, the higher the hit rate. As the war demanded" (101). Years later, Ratzinger confessed that these experiences still occasionally gave him sweaty nightmares.Seewald goes on to describe the exceptional postwar context in which Ratzinger prepared for the priesthood. The future priests knew that they would soon have to hear confessions of ex-Nazis who had shot people in the war (153). Indeed, after the war, many old Nazis turned to the Church and attempted to get de-Nazification certificates. Ratzinger's parish priest even joked that one day "they will say the only Nazis were the priests" (131).As did everyone, Ratzinger also felt the effects of poverty in postwar Germany. Whenever a festive dinner had to be given for a visitor at the seminary, "we went hungry on the most meagre rations for four long weeks in order to gather the ingredients" (189). After a short period of pastoral ministry subsequent to his ordination, the stellar theologian went back to the seminary as a teacher. Barely twenty-five-years-old, he was younger... (shrink)